W.E.A. Credit Union v. Paula Pace : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1977
W.E.A. Credit Union v. Paula Pace : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Pete N. Vlahos, Esq.; Vlahos and Knowlton; Attorney for Appellant.
Timothy W. Blackburn, Esq.; Browning, Blackburn and Baldwin; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation












1-5 JUM 1977 
BRIGKAM YGUKC UNIVERSITY 
J. Reubc: Law School 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
W.E.A. CREDIT UNION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PAULA PACE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 14561 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from Judgment of the Second Judicial 
District Court of Weber County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable John F. Walquist presiding. 
PETE N. VLAHOS, ESQ. 
VLAHOS and KNOWLTON 
Attorney for Appellant 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
TIMOTHY W. BLACKBURN, ESQ. 
BROWNING, BLACKBURN and BALDWIN 
Attorney for Respondent 
2605 Washington Blvd. 
Bank of Utah, Suite 320 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
F I L E D 
MAR 1 5 1977 
Clerk, Suproma Court, Utah 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT Of THE NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL , . 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHEN BOTH SPOUSES HAVE PLEDGED THE SAME 
PERSONAL PROPERTY TO SECURE LOANS WITH 
TWO DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONS, THE HUSBAND'S 
BANKRUPTCY AND HIS SUBSEQUENT PURCHASE 
OF THE PLEDGED COLLATERAL FROM THE FIRST 
LIEN HOLDER DOES NOT EXTINGUISH THE 
SECOND LIEN HOLDER'S INTEREST ;... 3 
POINT II 
A SECURED PARTY MAY OBTAIN POSSESSION 
OF PROPERTY PLEDGED AS SECURITY BY BOTH 
SPOUSES BY MEANS OF LEGAL ACTION AGAINST 




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED: 
Ades v. Catlin, et ux. , 132 Md. 66, 103 A. 94 (1918) 9 
Brown v. Cleverly, 93 Utah 54, 70 P.2d 881 (1937) 6 
Clark v. Huckably, 28 F.2d 154 (CCA.,8th Cir.,1928) 5 
First National Bank of Leesburg v. Hector Supply Co., 
254 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1971)... 8 
Kamas Security Co. v. Taylor, 119 Utah 2d 241, 226 P.2d 
111 (1950). . . 6 
National Finance Co. v. Valdez, 11 Utah 2d 339,359 P.2d 
9 (1961) 6 
Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764 ( C C A . , 4th Cir., 
1931) 8 
STATUTES CITED: 
Utah Code Annotated, 70A-9-201 . 4 
11 United States Code i 1(15) 5 
SECONDARY AUTHORITY: 
64 A.L.R. 2d 8 7 
68 Arn- J u r- , 2d, Secured Transactions, § 196 4 
i i 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
W.E.A. CREDIT UNION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PAULA PACE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 14561 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the Respondent, who 
was the Plaintiff in the Lower Court, on an Order To Show 
Cause why the Court should not order the Appellant, who was 
the Defendant in the Lower Court, to deliver to the 
Respondent property upon which the Respondent had a lien 
upon a secured transaction entered into and signed by both 
the Appellant and her spouse which pledged the property as 
security. The Complaint and- the Order To Show Cause did 
not have joined with it the spouse of the Appellant, but 
was an action against the Appellant onl^. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court did grant to the Respondent the 
right to possession of the security pledged by the Appellant, 
without having joined in said cause of action the spouse of 
the Appellant. 
-1-
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent seeks an order affirming the 
Lower Court's granting to the Respondent a right to immediate 
possession of the property which had been pledged to secure 
a loan from the Respondent to the Appellant and her spouse, 
without the joinder of the Appellant's spouse in the action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent disagrees with the facts as outlined 
by the Appellant in the following ways: 
1. The Respondent brought an Order To Show 
Cause seeking an order requiring Appellant to deliver the 
security as listed on the April 1, 1974 note to Respondent. 
(R-19) 
2. An Order was signed and issued by the Lower 
Court on April 1, 1976, directing the Sheriff of Weber 
County to take possession of the security and turn it over to 
the Respondent to be sold under the terms of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. (R-32) 
3. The Court issued the Writ of Replevin, 
after Respondent's hearing on the Order To Show Cause, but 
before trial. (R-33) 
4. The Writ of Replevin was issued by the 
Clerk of the District Court on April 1, 1976; however it was 
never delivered to the sheriff for service. On the 21st day 
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of April, 1976, the Respondent brought a motion to waive 
undertaking pursuant to rule 64(F) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure; Appellant's counsel David Knowlton appeared 
The Court granted said motion and an Order Waiving the 
Undertaking was entered on April 23, 1976. These documents 
were not filed with the Lower Court as Respondent received 
an Order from the honorable Bruce S. Jenkins staying further 
proceedings. (See Appendix) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHEN BOTH SPOUSES HAVE PLEDGED THE SAME PERSONAL 
PROPERTY TO SECURE LOANS WITH TWO DIFFERENT 
INSTITUTIONS, THE HUSBAND'S BANKRUPTCY AND HIS 
SUBSEQUENT PURCHASE OF THE PLEDGED COLLATERAL 
FROM THE FIRST LIEN HOLDER DOES NOT EXTINGUISH 
THE SECOND LIEN HOLDER'S INTEREST. 
It is important initially to determine where title 
to the security pledged lies. If title passed to the first 
lien holder, the subsequent purchase by the husband of the 
Appellant after his Bankruptcy would have vested title solely in 
him clear of any liens. If title did not pass, but remained 
in the spouses, the subsequent purchase would only have 
extinguished the first lien and title could not have passed 
solely to the husband because thefirst lien holder had never 
acquired title. 
The transactions by the Paces were secured trans-
-3-
.actions which fall under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. The general policy of Article 9 makes title relatively 
unimportant in connection with any secured transaction. Article 
9 adopts neither a "title theory" nor a "lien theory" and does 
not determine title to collateral in either the secured 
party or the debtor. 70A-9-201, Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended in 1953, and comments thereto. 
However, in some instances it may be necessary 
in a secured transaction subject to Article 9 to determine 
the location of title in order to apply some rule of law 
outside of the Code. In these instances, it would seem that 
the rules under pre-code law might apply. 
"In general, under pre-code law, title to pledged 
property remained in the pledgor, and only a special 
property vested in the pledgee. A pledge did not 
confer title to the collateral but only a lien there-
on to the extent of the obligation." 68 Arn. Jur. , 2d, 
Secured Transactions, § 196. 
Hence the Appellant and her spouse had title to the property 
and never transferred it to either lending institution. The 
Bankruptcy Court could have obtained title to the property; 
but by giving a disclaimer to the first lien holder the 
Bankruptcy Court never acquired title. Rather, there was a 
revesting of title in the spouses as of the date of the filing 
of the petition in Bankruptcy and the Paces continued to hold 
title as if Bankruptcy had never occurred. As a consequence 
of the disclaimer, the Bankruptcy Court could not adjudicate 
-4-
persons' rights in the property. This must be done in 
state court since the property is not part of the 
Bankruptcy estate and hence not subject to its jurisdiction. 
(Clark v. Huckably, 28 F.2d 154 (C.C.A., 8th Cir., 1928)) 
The law is clear that a person can transfer only 
whatever interest he may have in property. Therefore, when 
the Appellant's spouse purchased the property from the first 
lien holder, he was only clearing that lien; there was no 
transfer of title. Mr. Pace knew of the second security 
agreement with the Respondent and could not claim bona 
fide purchaser status with respect to the property. The 
legal effect of the purchase was to extinguish the first 
security interest and make the second security interest 
held by the Respondent primary; the purchase in no way 
affected this security interest. 
The Appellant's spouse was discharged in 
Bankruptcy of his debt owed to the Respondent. Likewise, 
Appellant, subsequent to the Lower Court's decision, was 
similarly discharged in Bankruptcy. But neither discharge 
had an effect on the Respondent's lien. The term "discharge 
in Bankruptcy" is defined in the Bankruptcy Act as the 
release of a bankrupt from all his debts which are provable, 
except those excepted under the Act. (11 U.S.C.§ 1(15)) 
What it means to be "released" is found in court decisions. 
-5-
In the case of Brown v. Cleverly, 93 Utah 54, 70 P,2d 881 (1937), 
at page 887, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"As a general rule, and except in cases where § 67f 
applies, the discharge in Bankruptcy does not effect 
an existing lien and only releases the debtor's 
personal 1i abi1i ty." 
In National Finance Co. v. Valdez, 11 Utah 2d 339, 359 P.2d 
9 (1961) the Court further explained: 
"A discharge in Bankruptcy is neither a payment nor 
an extinguishment of the debt. It is merely a bar to 
the enforcement of a "discharged debt by legal proceedings." 
In the case of Kamas Securities Co. v. Taylor, 119 Utah 2d 
241, 226 P.2d 111 (1950) the Court commented on a section of 
the Restatement of the Law of Securities which stated that 
a pledge is not terminated by the running of the statute of 
limitations against the claim secured by the pledge, nor by 
a discharge of the claim in Bankruptcy. The Court used this 
language at page 117 in stating that extinguishing the debt 
does not extinguish the security interest: 
"Certain statutes which in terms seem to extinguish 
the debt, have been interpreted as statutes of lim-
itations. Even when interpreted as extinguishing the 
debts, the effect is not to terminate a security 
interest unless it is especaslly provided that sec-
urity interests are to end with the extinguishment 
of the debts." 
The Respondent has a security interest in the prop-
erty. Its debt was discharged in Bankruptcy, but not its 
security interest. If properly pleaded, the discharge in 
Bankruptcy is a complete defense to enforcement of the debt, 
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but it neither destroys the debt nor the moral obligation 
to pay. A debt is divested of its character as a personal 
obligation which is legally enforceable, but it remains in 
existence so that security given for the debt may be 
resorted to in satisfaction of the security agreement. 
POINT II 
A SECURED PARTY MAY OBTAIN POSSESSION OF 
PROPERTY PLEDGED AS SECURITY BY BOTH SPOUSES 
BY MEANS OF LEGAL ACTION AGAINST ONE OF THE 
SPOUSES. 
There is no argument that the common law 
estate by the entirety might be recognized in Utah. There 
is an open question, however, if recognition is extended 
beyond estates in real property to personal property. 
The Appellant refers to two Utah statutes in her brief; but 
neither statute plainly extends its coverage to personal 
property. While most American jurisdictions recognize the 
estate in real property, there is a split among those 
jurisdictions which have ruled on its existence as to 
personalty. A majority of these jurisdictions have held 
that the estate may exist in personalty; while at least 
seven jurisdictions have held that it may not. 64 A.L.R. 2d 
8, $§ 6,7. There is no prior case law in Utah, but if Utah 
does follow the majority, there are additional questions, 
such as, by what instruments or transactions the estate may 
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arise? is there a presumption for household goods and furn-
ishings in joint possession of the husband and wife? Add-
itionally, the Florida court in First National Bank of 
Leesburg v. Hector Supply Co., 254 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1971), 
made an important distinction regarding the existence in 
personal property. At page 780, the Florida Court noted 
that not only must there be the form of ownership consistent 
with entirety (as required for real property); but that as 
a second standard the intention of the parties to hold the 
personal property by the entirety must be proven by the 
spouses. If tenancy by the entirety is recognized in 
personal property in Utah, the better view is to require 
a showing by the spouses of their intention and the manner 
of their obtaining the property, which is not present in the 
current action. 
Even if the Paces do hold the property subject to 
the Respondent's lien by the entirety, the cases cited by 
the Appellant do not preclude the Respondent from obtaining 
possession of the property by action only against the 
Appellant. The case of Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764 
(C.C.A., 4th Cir., 1931) is irrelevant to the issue before 
the Court and is distinguishable on its facts. The facts 
of Krakower are similar only to the facts of this case in 
that the husband was adjudicated a Bankrupt, but his wife 
was not at the time of the action. The case deals with 
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staying the husband's Bankruptcy proceeding, while Krakower 
sues in the state court against both husband and wife to 
obtain a judgment. In upholding the lower court's staying 
of the Bankruptcy proceeding, the court stated: 
"The discharge in Bankruptcy not only prevents 
judgment being obtained against him on the note, 
but will also prevent, during his lifetime, the 
property held by the entireties being subjected 
to the satisfaction of any judgment which may be 
obtained against his wife." (Emphasis added) 
The case of Ades v. Catlin, et ux, 132 Md. 66, 103 A. 94 
(1918) is similarly irrelevant on its facts. 
Both of these cases, and others cited by Appellant, 
dealt with a creditor trying to obtain a judgment lien after 
Bankruptcy has occurred. In the present action, the 
Respondent is not now seeking to obtain a lien by judgment. 
Before either Bankruptcy, the Paces had voluntarily given 
a lien pledging the property as security. This lien survives 
the discharge in Bankruptcy of the debt and the collateral 
can be obtained pursuant to the default provisions of 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
To allow an assertion that the non-severance 
feature of tenancy by the entireties precludes a secured 
party from obtaining jointly pledged property would clearly 
be inequitable. If so permitted, a spouse could pledge 
property as security which the secured party could not get 
upon default as long as the other spouse is Bankrupt, which 
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would have the effect of eliminating this type of property 
from collateral status. In not permitting such an assertion, 
this field of credit which would otherwise be closed to the 
spouses remains open for the benefit of the spouses and the 
secured lendors. 
The Appellant contends that the Respondent should 
have filed for a disclaimer in Bankruptcy Court during the 
Bankruptcy proceeding of the Appellant's spouse and allowed 
said court to determine what interest Respondent may have 
had in the property; that failure to do so prevents the 
Respondent from asserting its right against the property in 
the action against the Appellant. However, the Bankruptcy 
Court gave a disclaimer to the first lien holder, in effect 
saying that it did not want to be bothered with the property. 
It does not make sense to file fo.r a second disclaimer when 
the Bankruptcy Court has released the security. What 
additional good would two disclaimers have done? By disclaiming 
any interest in the security the Bankruptcy Court places the 
dispute in state court (CI ark, supra, page 5) and puts the 
parties in the same position regarding rights in the collateral 
as if no Bankruptcy petition had been filed. Hence, the 
Bankruptcy Court could not have in fact determined the 
Respondent's interest as the Appellant argues. 
When a husband and wife execute a note together, 
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the obligation to pay is a joint and several liability. 
Mr. Pace's prior Bankruptcy would be a complete defense 
to suit against him on the debt, but not a defense to the 
liability of his wife. Her signature guaranteed the 
availability of the property and, because of the joint 
and several liability, she is personally liable for the 
debt and she may be sued and the property taken as against 
her. As in Point I , her subsequent Bankruptcy did not 
extinguish the lien. On the premises of estate by the 
entirety, the Appellant argues that the husband should have 
been a party to this action. This probably would have 
been more correct procedurely, so that the Appellant 
cannot play the "shell game" of ownership; and the simple 
process of joining could be done. However, in substance, 
the court can reach the same result with only the 
Appellant as party since the security interest is not 
affected by the discharge in Bankruptcy of either spouse 
and can be foreclosed by process against either spouse, 
as both signed the note. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent has a security interest in the 
property pledged, because title in the property always 
remained with the Paces and never passed to either the 
Bankruptcy Court or the lien holders. The Bankruptcy 
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proceeding does not discharge the security interests but 
.only the debt. Since a disclaimer was given with respect' 
to the property, the state court is the appropriate court 
to adjudicate the parties interests in the property. It 
is submitted that the Appellant is severally liable for the 
debt and that suit against her alone is proper. Also, her 
intervening Bankruptcy likewise did not affect the lien held 
by the Respondent. The Respondent is entitled to satisfy 
the lien as outlined per statute. The provisions of the 
Uniform Commercial Code do not conflict or supersede the 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act since this issue involves 
only disclaimed property and the foreclosure of a lien which 
was in existence prior to any Bankruptcy proceedings. A 
tenuous assertion of an estate by the entireties should not 
be effective to defeat the rights of the secured party as to 
the property and thus Replevin by the secured party is 
appropri ate. 
Respectively submitted, 
TIMOTHY W. BI7ACKBURN 
Attorney foty Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
A copy of the forgoing Brief of Respondent 
was posted in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, and 
addressed.to the Attorney of Appellant, Pete N. Vlahos, 
Esq., Legal Forum Building, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, 
Utah 84401, on this the /^ day of March, 1977. 
a H'w 2LLMOJ2^ 
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Order to Waive Undertaking 
Writ of Replevin 
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Order Staying Proceedings 
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TIMOTHY W. BLACKBURN 
BROWNING AND BLACKBURN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
521 Eccles Building 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: 393-8463 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 





ORDER TO WAIVE UNDERTAKING 
Civil No. 63776 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on 
plaintiff's motion to waive undertaking on the 21st day of April, 
1976 before the honorable Calvin Gould, one of the Judges of said 
Court, Timothy W. Blackburn appearing on behalf of the plaintiff 
and David Knowlton appearing on behalf of the defendant and the 
Court having heard the arguments of the respective counsel and 
being fully apprised in the premises makes the following order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the bond requirement of 
Rule 64B be waived in the above matter. 
Dated this ^TS day of April, 1976. 
EXHIBIT A 
TIMOTHY W. BLACKBURN 
BROWNING AND BLACKBURN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
521 Eccles Bldg. 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: 393-8463 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 




WRIT OF REPLEVIN 
File No. 63776 
Defendant. 
THE STATE OF UTAH: 
To the Sheriff of Dami^ County, Utah, Greetings: 
WHEREAS, an Order pursuant to Order to Show Cause was entered 
in the above case, in the District Court of Weber County, Utah, 
holding that the plaintiff was entitled to take possession of cer-
tain personal property hereinafter described, and that the Sheriff 
was to take possession of said property and turn it over to the 
plaintiff for disposition under the terms of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. 
NOW, THEREFORE, we command you, the said Sheriff, to pick 
up said property, to-wit: sofa, 2 chairs, 1 end table, 2 lamps, 
RCA 19" Color TV, Sears 171 Deep Freeze, Coldspot Refrigerator, 
Maytag Washer, 9' Sofa, 2 chairs, 2 lamps, Jennair counter top 
trill, bedroom set, 2 ten speed bikes, and turn said property 
over the the plaintiff for disposition under the terms of the 
Uniform Commercial Code as set forth in said Order. 
WITNESS, the Hon JOHN F. WAHLQU1ST Judge of the 
District Court of Weber County, Utah, this [__ day of April,1976. 
K Given under my hand and the seal of said Court this j5 
day of April, 1976. 
CLERK WENDELL HANSEN 
B y v ^ r q ^ . N x C ^ C 
Deputy Clerk 
=-V_\_ 
DALE T. BROWNING 
TIMOTHY W. BLACKBURN|| 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
ECCLES BLDG. 
OGDEN, UTAH 
EXHIB IT B 
TIMOTHY W. BLACKBURN 
BROWNING AND BLACKBURN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
521 Eccles Building 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: 393-8463 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 




PAULA PACE, + 
Defendant. + " File No. 63776 
TO THE SHERIFF OF WEBER COUNTY, UTAH: 
You will serve the attached Exccu^im. on the 
Defendant and attach the personal property listed thereon and 
turn the same over to the Plaintiff for sale under the provisions 
of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Said property is located at 5780 Village Way in 
Ogden, Utah. 
If you need assistance for identification or trans-
portation of said property, please contact the plaintiff's agent 
Mr. Bremser at 399-5941, ext. 373^ to make said arrangements. 
•" p 
Dated this / day of CLQ. -7 ; V 3 1976. 
WENDELL HANSEN, CLFR?' 
CLERK 
*ih>jccii\,i\c y?/ C- yU\ 
Deputy C l e r k ^ 
EXHIBIT C 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION 
IN RE / 
PAULA PACE, / Bankruptcy No. B-76-_ 
Bankrupt. / 
ORDER STAYING PROCEEDINGS 
Upon the Motion of Paula Pace, the Bankrupt above named, 
praying that in accordance with Rule 601(a) of the Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure, an Order be issued staying any act for the 
commencement or continuation of any Court proceeding to enforce 
a lien against property in the custody of the Bankruptcy Court, 
and it appearing that the Petitioner in Bankruptcy, Paula Pace, 
has filed a Petition in Bankruptcy and that the property in 
possession of the Bankrupt is now in the custody of this Court, 
it is 
ORDERED, that all proceedings be stayed as against the 
Bankrupt-Petitioner and that notice be served upon W.E.A. Credit 
Union and upon the Sheriff of Weber County, that the enforcement 
of any lien as against the Petitioner herein is stayed until 
final adjudication by this Court. 
DATED at Salt Lake City*,! UtafT,) thisMZ7J%day of May, 1976 afJ Ut* Q thisc^S^iday of May, 19' 
BANKRUPTCY CQORT /UDGE 
EXHIBIT D 
